Standing Committee G

[Mr. Edward O'Hara in the Chair]

Fire and Rescue Services Bill

Clause 30 - Training institution and centres

Philip Hammond: I beg to move amendment No. 108, in
clause 30, page 13, line 15, at end insert— 
 '(1A) The Fire Service College shall be deemed to be established by the Secretary of State in accordance with subsection (1)'.
 It is good to welcome you back to the Chair, Mr. O'Hara. 
 The clause deals with training institutions and provides that 
''The Secretary of State may establish and maintain— 
 (a) a central training institution, and 
 (b) one or more local training centres''.
 However, when we read the explanatory notes, we see that the magic word ''regional'' creeps in again. It is not in the Bill. The explanatory notes suggest that the Secretary of State might want to create regional training centres.

Nick Raynsford: What about ''European''?

Philip Hammond: The Minister is quite wrong: the word ''European'' does not appear anywhere. That is yesterday's argument, if I may say so. Let us focus on the issues that are on the agenda. The Government's regional agenda is clearly at the forefront of the issues that we have to consider. The Government's European agenda appears to have been abandoned in the face of the overwhelming hostility of the electorate. No doubt the regional agenda will be abandoned in the face of the overwhelming hostility of the electorate in due course.

Nick Raynsford: Dream on.

Philip Hammond: Given the amount of public money that the Minister is throwing at the issue, trying to secure the vote that he wants, I am not surprised that he thinks that he will win the argument, but I suspect that the outcome will be somewhat different.

Phil Hope: What has this got to do with the fire service?

Philip Hammond: The answer is quite a lot. One of the consistent themes that we have had to consider is the Government's clear intention to introduce a regional dimension to the fire service and to create a regional fire authority when an elected regional assembly is created in any region, taking away powers from local authorities. That is precisely what the Minister of State told us on another occasion was not the purpose of the
 creation of regional assemblies. Ever since, we have seen that commitment steadily eroded.
 To return to the issue of colleges and training centres, we need to know the Government's intentions. There is clearly no problem with the Secretary of State running a central training institution, with local fire authorities running local training institutions, or with groups of fire authorities getting together to run local training institutions.

Jim Knight: Regional ones?

Philip Hammond: The problem is that the word ''regional'' has been corrupted. We cannot use the term in its natural and proper sense. If a group of fire authorities got together and created a training centre for use by six or seven authorities, that might naturally be referred to as a regional training centre. However, the sense in which the Government use the word means a training centre based on the Government office regions—those bureaucratic boundaries that have been drawn on a map.
 We need to understand the Government's intentions, because it would be unnatural if the Secretary of State had it in mind to create a training centre in each Government office region. That would be inappropriate and superfluous. It would be a waste of money—just like the rest of the regional agenda. 
 In anticipation of the fact that there probably will not be a need for a stand part debate, I hope that I can address a few other issues before coming on to the amendment. Why does the Secretary of State need the specific power under clause 30? Why can he not do what he is permitted to do by clause 30 under clause 28(2), which seems to give him a pretty broad power to ''establish and maintain'' organisations that he considers appropriate? I would have thought that training was well within that remit. 
 I would also like an answer to a question about charging. If the Secretary of State creates training centres and institutions, presumably, he will be able to charge fire authorities that use them. I am not suggesting that that is improper, but there is no clear power to do that under clause 30. There is such a provision in clause 28 for organisations created under the power in that clause. If the intention is to charge and to make the institution self-financing, can the Under-Secretary point to the provision from which the Secretary of State would derive the power to charge? 
 Amendment No. 108 is a probing amendment. It was difficult to make my hand write an amendment that named a specific institution, because I hate amendments that do that. Its purpose is simply to ask the Under-Secretary to confirm that he intends the Fire Service College to continue in its current role and function, and indeed to have an expanded role and function. I hope that he will say something helpful about the role that he envisages for it. If his scheme includes the creation of further training centres and institutions, how will they relate to the Fire Service College? As the amendment would place a reference to the Fire Services College in the Bill, it will allow that short debate to take place. Once I have heard what the Under-Secretary says, I am sure that I shall be able to seek leave to withdraw the amendment.

Phil Hope: Mr. O'Hara, can I clarify whether, in responding to the amendment, I can speak more fully about the Fire Service College, if we are not to have a clause stand part debate, as the hon. Gentleman said?

Edward O'Hara: There seems to be a willingness on all sides to incorporate a clause stand part debate in the debate on the amendment, so yes.

Phil Hope: Thank you, Mr. O'Hara.
 Clause 30 re-enacts and enhances provision in section 23(1) of the Fire Services Act 1947, which allows the Secretary of State to establish and to maintain a central training institution for the fire and rescue service and one or more local training centres. We believe that the amendment is unnecessary, as I think the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Mr. Hammond) recognises. 
 I can confirm to the hon. Member for Cotswold (Mr. Clifton-Brown) that the central training institution referred to in the clause is the Fire Service College. It is referred to there instead of being embraced in clause 28(2) because we want to put beyond doubt what the training institutions can do. That is why clause 30 contains detailed descriptions of the purposes of such an institution under subsection (2)(a) to (f). In particular, the Fire Service College is funded on a commercial basis and has a trading fund. 
 The college in Moreton-in-Marsh has a long-established role as our national training centre for the fire and rescue service. It has internationally acknowledged expertise in operational incident command training, centred on its unique fire ground. The White Paper ''Our Fire and Rescue Service'' recommends building on that role and developing the college into a centre of excellence for the fire and rescue service. The clause gives the college the flexibility that it needs to respond to the changing needs of a modernised fire and rescue service. Subsection (1) therefore re-enacts section 23(1) of the 1947 Act, while subsection (2)(a) to (d) sets out in more detail the college's role in providing direct training for the fire and rescue service and supporting training delivered elsewhere. 
 The hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge described regional government as a waste of time and money. I think that that was his phrase. He might like to explain that to the hundreds of Conservative councillors who play an active role in regional assemblies across the country and do so to good effect.

Edward O'Hara: Order. We need not go any further down that road.

Phil Hope: I understand, Mr. O'Hara, but I could not resist the opportunity to make that point.
 Components of the national work force development strategy will be delivered nationally, regionally and locally. The Fire Service College's role will be to provide the specialist and operational training that will be a mandatory element of the integrated personal development system at key stages and to maintain standards in training being provided at regional or local level. 
 Subsection (2)(e) and (f) refer to the provision by the college of training and advice beyond the UK fire 
 and rescue service, both here and overseas. The UK fire and rescue service will remain the college's primary focus. However, the college has an established reputation in the wider UK fire industry and with international fire and rescue services, for which it has provided training when it has had the capacity to do so. In answer to the hon. Gentleman's question, we expect that aspect of the college's training to increase, as its distance and e-learning capabilities increase further. 
 I have visited the college twice in the past six months, and I am looking forward to doing so in the near future to discuss its business plan for the coming year. My right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister also visited the college in September. We were both impressed by the uniqueness of the fire ground and the potential for the college to build on its reputation as a national centre for incident command training to provide specialist training in urban search and rescue and other new dimension techniques. We are close to opening the new urban search and rescue facility that was started last year.

Philip Hammond: The Minister referred to the fact that the college is currently established as a trading fund. My question really concerns the basis on which the college has that status. It is clearly re-established by the clause, given that the 1947 Act is being scrapped. I do not see any provision on that other than the one by which the Secretary of State may establish and maintain it. Where does the college derive the right to operate as a trading fund from its new establishment base in the clause?

Phil Hope: The hon. Gentleman must recognise that, in re-establishing the training centre, we are simply re-enacting the provision in the 1947 Act in subsection (1) of the Bill. Under the 1947 Act, the college had the power to charge. It has been doing so, and many fire and rescue organisations around the country and from overseas attend the college. They pay for the excellent training provided. Whatever concerns the hon. Gentleman has about training and charging, the provision is established, in addition to the 1947 Act, under the Government Training Funds Act 1973, which is unchanged by the Bill—thank goodness—and allows the college to continue to charge.
 Training and development are at the heart of our modernisation agenda and when inspiration comes, in the way that it often does in these Committees, it is good to see that the hon. Gentleman values the contribution that is made.

Philip Hammond: Before the Under-Secretary sits down, I would like to thank him for his answer that explains how the process works very well, but he has not said anything about his current intentions with regard to the creation of further training centres by the Secretary of State. Will he tell us what the plans are?

Phil Hope: I regret that I cannot spell those out in detail. We have a national work force development strategy and we know that delivering that strategy, particularly the integrated personal development system that will provide new opportunities for career development for firefighters, will require the provision
 of training at a national or central level. That will happen at the Fire Service College. It will need to happen at a regional level where it makes sense to bring together people in a region to carry out training relevant to the region. As we move on to the resilience agenda, one can imagine that services provided at regional level may well require a regional opportunity for firefighters in that area to be trained on equipment in that region.
 At a local level, many fire and rescue services provide their own training, and some work together to provide joint training opportunities. The Bill provides the flexibility for the Secretary of State to promote and continue that raft of training opportunities at the appropriate level—local, regional or national—and to deliver skills and career development opportunities for firefighters in every aspect of the fire service's functions. Training and development are at the heart of our modernisation agenda. They are major levers for achieving change in the fire and rescue service. We are investing more than £7.5 million in the college this year, so that it can realise its potential and develop its facilities and infrastructure to match the expectations of the various stakeholders with an interest. 
 I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment on the basis of the reassurance that I have given him: the institution referred to in the clause is, indeed, the Fire Service College. I hope that my elaboration of the points that he raised means that he is able to support the clause.

Philip Hammond: I am grateful to the Minister for his answer. I have done what my hon. Friend the Member for Cotswold, in whose constituency the college resides, would have expected. I am sure that the bunting will be out in Moreton-in-Marsh in response to the Minister's confirmation that the college is the central training institution referred to. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 30 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 31 - Negotiating bodies

Philip Hammond: I beg to move amendment No. 149, in
clause 31, page 13, line 36, after 'may,' insert 'subject to subsection (1A)'.

Edward O'Hara: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 150, in
clause 31, page 13, line 39, at end insert— 
 '(1A) the Secretary of State may only make regulations under subsection (1) if he has secured the agreement of the Scottish Executive and the Welsh Assembly to collaborate in a scheme, the effect of which is that the bodies created under subsection (1) will also have the function of negotiating the conditions of service of employees of fire and rescue authorities in Wales and of fire authorities in Scotland.'.

Philip Hammond: This is an important clause. The Committee may be relieved to hear that it is the last clause about which there is likely to be controversy. I will not say the last clause about which there will be lots to say, because I am sure that the Committee will
 want to investigate the pensions area thoroughly, but I do not think that that is controversial.
 There are a number of issues arising from the clause. In speaking to these amendments, and later to the other groups, I shall try to be narrow because I am particularly anxious that we get the opportunity for a stand part debate on the clause. As you will know, Mr. O'Hara, some amendments which were tabled have not been selected, so it will not be possible to consider in debates on amendments some of the issues that members of the Committee wished to investigate. I therefore hope that we will be able to have a stand part debate as well. 
 The clause provides for the Secretary of State to be able to establish a negotiating body, and effectively then to give that body exclusive rights and instructions as to how it is to go about its business. Although the Minister of State may be a little coy about this, the provision is a linchpin of the Government's strategy to reduce the Fire Brigades Union's influence over the fire services, increasing the influence of other representative bodies and ensuring what we might regard as a more balanced situation. The term ''negotiating body'' looks like a slight misnomer when the body will be susceptible to direction from the Secretary of State in how it conducts its deliberations. We will explore some of those areas a little later, in succeeding debates. 
 The amendments address a particular concern arising from the splitting of responsibilities for England, Wales and Scotland. Amendment No. 149 is a paving amendment for No. 150, the substantive amendment, which would require the Secretary of State to establish a negotiating body only where he has reached agreement with the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly to the effect that the negotiating body could negotiate pay and conditions for fire and rescue or Scottish fire service employees throughout the whole of the United Kingdom. 
 I am a long-term believer in local pay flexibility and negotiation. I remember during the strike last year talking to firefighters from my constituency who, with some cause, were complaining about the difficulty of living in Surrey, with housing costs the way they are, on £21,000 plus £256 weighting allowance. Equally, I remember having a discussion with somebody from the north-east, who honestly, if privately, admitted that £21,000 was not a bad salary considering his local economy. He was faintly embarrassed at striking for £30,000 when most of his friends and neighbours were certainly not earning significantly more than firefighters were before the dispute. 
 My purpose in tabling the amendment is to voice a concern felt by fire and rescue authority employers. Hitherto, there has been a UK-wide approach to the matter, which includes Scotland. Under the current negotiating arrangements, the Scottish fire authority employers are represented alongside their English and Welsh counterparts. 
 We need to understand how the Secretary of State would use his powers to impose a negotiating machinery if the current negotiations with the national joint council were to fail to agree a new 
 structure. I understand that his powers would extend only to England. Unless he were to meet the arrangements in the amendment, the negotiating machinery would relate only to England, and Scotland and Wales would have separate machinery. 
 Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
 On resuming—

Philip Hammond: I was concluding my remarks when we were interrupted. I would like to know whether the Minister recognises and intends that there should not be separate national negotiating forums for Wales, England and Scotland. That is not to say that there should be a single negotiating structure, as there may be horizontally separate negotiating structures for different groups of employees. If his intention is as I have described, how does he intend to ensure that it can be given effect, if he is in the position of imposing the negotiating machinery via the powers in this clause?

Nick Raynsford: The current negotiating machinery, which is under discussion by the parties, is crucial to the modernisation of the fire and rescue service. As I expect that we will have a more ample debate on the wider principles of the negotiating machinery, I shall make no further comments about it now, other than to repeat the obvious point that it was the subject of a central recommendation of the Bain review of the fire service. In this, as in so many other areas, we are working on the basis of recommendations in that report.
 As I said, the existing negotiation arrangements are under review. We hope that the review will lead to improved arrangements that meet the needs of a modern fire and rescue service. The clause provides the Secretary of State with reserve powers to establish statutory negotiating bodies for England should the review fail to deliver appropriate improvements. 
 Amendments Nos. 149 and 150 seek to ensure that a negotiating body established under the clause would negotiate conditions of service for employees of fire and rescue authorities in Scotland and Wales, as well as England. As the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge has rightly pointed out, the existing negotiating arrangements work on a UK-wide basis. We would prefer that to continue. 
 If, however, we were to decide to draw down the powers in the Bill and establish a statutory body, it would make sense for England and Scotland to legislate in their respective areas of competence. That is logical, in view of the fact that responsibility for the fire and rescue service is already devolved to Scotland and Northern Ireland and will be devolved to Wales as part of the Bill. The financial and policy framework is already devolved. It is therefore possible that over time our financial and policy positions may diverge and we would not wish to be bound by statute to negotiate as one. However, I repeat that we have no intention at 
 present to vary the existing arrangements for UK-wide negotiation.

Philip Hammond: I think that the Minister is saying that he does not want to be bound in the Bill to proceed with the use of these powers if he has been able to reach agreement with the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. If I am interpreting him correctly, he is also saying that he would seek to reach such an agreement. In other words, if he were imposing a negotiating body, he would prefer it to have a UK-wide remit.

Nick Raynsford: The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. Our intention is to continue with the current arrangements for UK-wide negotiating machinery, and to agree that through administrative arrangements if necessary.
 As I am sure the hon. Gentleman will understand, the difficulty with the amendments is that not only would they bind the Government through statute to seeking agreements from Scotland and Wales before any arrangements could be put in place, but they would effectively give the Scottish Executive and the Welsh Assembly a veto over the establishment of a statutory negotiating body for England. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will recognise that that would not be a satisfactory position. I put it to him that it is slightly curious for a party that is constantly quoting the West Lothian question at us to believe it appropriate for the Scottish Executive and Welsh Assembly to be able to dictate negotiating arrangements in England.

Philip Hammond: For the record, the amendments go further than that. I said very clearly that my own instinct is for local pay negotiation. What we are doing is performing one of the functions of an Opposition, which is to bring forward questions from qualified outside bodies that have concerns, and to air them in a way that allows Ministers to respond to them. I hope that the Minister will take the amendment in the spirit in which it was tabled, that of inquiry on behalf of fire and rescue authorities that perceive a problem.

Nick Raynsford: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that, and I return the compliment by saying that I hope that my explanation satisfies him, and that he will withdraw his probing amendment.

Philip Hammond: What the Minister said makes perfect sense, but the fact that this issue arises points to one of the items of fall-out—I will not call it a difficulty—from the devolution settlement. Increasingly, things that have been done on a pan-UK basis, to the extent that they require statutory powers to be done, cannot necessarily continue to be done on a pan-UK basis, and that may cause difficulties. However, I am reassured that if the Minister has to use these powers, he will seek arrangements that will allow the body to operate on a UK-wide basis.
 There are some funding questions. We all know that Scotland is better funded than the rest of the UK, and that may create tensions. We have seen that in other areas. Without wishing to digress, I point out the example of the funding of elderly people in care homes, to which the Scottish Executive have been able, 
 because of the greater availability of funding for a public service in Scotland, to take a different approach from that taken by the UK Government for the rest of the country. I foresee potential difficulties. 
 I invite the Minister to tell the Committee whether, if he goes down the route of using these powers, he will seek to agree how to proceed with his Welsh and Scottish colleagues. Has he had discussions with those colleagues on this matter, and is he confident that a UK-wide solution would be reached?

Nick Raynsford: The answer is yes—I have had discussions with colleagues, and I am confident that such an arrangement can be reached.

Philip Hammond: The Minister's words will be read with great interest by the people who suggested that this amendment be tabled in order to hear what he had to say. I say, job done, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Richard Younger-Ross: I beg to move amendment No. 182, in
clause 31, page 14, line 3, leave out subsection (2)(b) and insert— 
 '(b) Persons representing the interests of some or all employees of fire and rescue services, such persons being representative of organisations considered by the Secretary of State to be appropriate and the number of representatives being proportionate to membership of the organisation.'.

Edward O'Hara: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 183, in 
clause 31, page 14, line 26, at end add— 
 '(8) A fire and rescue authority will grant leave to representatives of trade unions representing employees in accordance with (2)(b) above, such leave to be granted subject to the provisions provided for in the ACAS Code of Practice—Time off for trade union duties and activities. 
 (9) The pay and conditions of all part-time employees will be on an equal pro-rata basis to full-time employees.'.

Richard Younger-Ross: These are both probing amendments, in much the same fashion as the previous amendments in the name of the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. I hope that they will take us, in part, to the area to which the Minister referred, and which he was, I think, hoping to discuss in the stand part debate. They may elicit some responses.
 Amendment No. 182 deals with the balance of the negotiating body, and the sort of structure that would be acceptable to the Minister. Obviously, we will have to wait and see what happens in the negotiations. Will the negotiating body be proportionate to those who represent the different parts of the Union? Without going round the houses, we are asking whether the Retained Firefighters Union would have a place at the table to negotiate terms and conditions. 
 Will the Minister go further and say that if fire service middle management decided that they wished to be represented, and they are not directly at present, such a structure would be represented on the negotiating body? We use the word ''proportionate'' 
 in the amendment, meaning representation on a fair and even platform. 
 Amendment No. 183, is about terms and conditions, and I am not sure why it has been lumped with No. 182.

Edward O'Hara: Order. I should point out that there is a misprint on the amendment paper. Amendment No. 183 has subsections (8) and (9). Subsection (9) is a misprint, and the debate should be confined to subsection (8).

Richard Younger-Ross: Thank you, Mr. O'Hara. I had been advised that we should consider only subsection (8).
 It has been brought to our attention that the resources made available to trade union officials are well in excess of the current recommended time off for trade union duties and activities in the ACAS code of practice. It had been put to us that ACAS recommendations should be seen as a maximum, but that would remove local discretion, which we do not seek to do. There should be a reference in the terms and conditions to the ACAS code, which should be the benchmark by which local authorities and fire and rescue authorities are judged.

Philip Hammond: Amendment No. 182 is an interesting probing of the Minister's intentions. As the hon. Member for Teignbridge (Richard Younger-Ross) said, we all know that the issue is about getting a proper voice at the table for representatives of firefighters other than the FBU, particularly retained firefighters, who require an appropriate voice in any future negotiations.
 In the interests of equity and a more rational and moderate debate about fire service matters, I welcome the opportunity for the Minister to confirm that any negotiating body, either established by him or as a result of current discussions, but ultimately sanctioned by him by virtue of his deciding not to use his powers under the clause, will be a body that contains a mix of employee representatives. 
 I would be grateful if the Minister were to confirm that any voluntary solution that he accepts, having been persuaded not to use his powers under the clause, must include representatives of employee bodies other than the FBU. 
 I say to the hon. Member for Teignmouth—

Richard Younger-Ross: Teignbridge.

Philip Hammond: I am not sure where ''Teenmouth'' is. Is there such a place?

Nick Raynsford: It is pronounced ''Tinmouth''.

Philip Hammond: Not another pronunciation error.

Nick Raynsford: It is not to be confused with Tynemouth.

Philip Hammond: I am not entirely sure about direct proportionality. The key point is representation on the body. Perhaps the Minister will say more about that.
 The hon. Member for Teignbridge made some interesting additional points about the representation of middle management. I strongly urge the Minister to establish a separate negotiating body for them. It 
 appears to me, as an observer, that one of the problems with delivering any kind of emergency cover during an industrial dispute is that there is no middle management outside the dispute process. Typically, when train drivers strike, there is a cadre of middle managers who can be hauled out of their offices and sat at a ticket barrier, or behind a train driver's console, where they can deploy their former skills to keep a skeleton service going. 
 A large proportion of the work of fire and rescue services is routine and, as we saw during the dispute, the amount of work that is emergency, ''must-respond'' work is really quite small. Such work could probably be managed quite well by a relatively small number of middle managers, perhaps with some support from small numbers of military personnel. That opens up a prospect of a much more manageable industrial relations situation in the fire service. I suspect that the Minister will not want to be drawn on his precise intentions in that regard, but I hope that he is thinking of having separate negotiating bodies for middle managers. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for Teignbridge to think carefully about his suggestion that middle managers should be represented on the negotiating body. 
 I am a little confused about amendment No. 183, Mr. O'Hara. Are we supposed to be considering part of it, but not the other part?

Edward O'Hara: We are considering subsection (8) only.

Philip Hammond: Will we come to the subject referred to in subsection (9) in due course?

Edward O'Hara: Yes. It is simply that the two are not connected.

Philip Hammond: It was not selected for this debate; I understand. So there will not be an opportunity to discuss what was a rather interesting suggestion from the hon. Member for Teignbridge. However, we will have the opportunity to discuss it under clause stand part.
 I look forward to hearing the Minister's comments.

Nick Raynsford: The hon. Member for Teignbridge will not be surprised when I tell him that I believe that amendment No. 182 is unnecessary. However, it has been helpful to have this short debate. As the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge anticipated, it is helpful to have an opportunity to spell out the Government's intentions in this respect.
 Subsection (2)(b) will ensure that employee representatives will be included on the negotiating body. Following consultation, regulations will be drawn up setting out how places on the negotiating body will be allocated. Although the general principle of proportionality is reasonable, there may well be exceptions. In the first place, a strict adoption of the principle of proportionality might result in pressure for a very large negotiating body. Alternatively, if it were kept to a more manageable size, which was one of the strong recommendations of the Bain review, with which we concur, that might mean excluding some of 
 the minority interests. Neither outcome, in our view, would be desirable. 
 I will quote from the Bain review and the White Paper to make our objectives absolutely clear. Paragraph 10.26 of the Bain review talks about the new NJC, which is envisaged as replacing current arrangements, and states that on the union side it should represent 
''the Fire Brigades' Union, the Retained Firefighters Union, the Fire Officers Association, the Association of Principal Fire Officers and Unison.''
 In our White Paper, which responded to that, we said: 
''We also agree with the Independent Review that a new negotiating body should involve representatives of the Retained Firefighters Union, the Fire Officers Association, and the Association of Principal Fire Officers.''
 That is why we intend to specify who should be involved. We envisage three separate negotiating bodies, covering different groups within the present grading structures: first, chief fire officers and assistant chief fire officers; secondly, middle management; and thirdly, firefighters and control room staff. The composition and chair of each body would be determined by the Deputy Prime Minister. The arrangements for non-uniformed staff, who are predominantly represented by Unison, would continue as at present: matters would continue to be handled predominantly through the local government negotiating arrangements. 
 I hope that that clarifies our intentions and how they fit in with our overall objective. It is compatible with the purpose of the amendment, it but might not be feasible if the amendment were accepted and we were strictly bound to follow its terms. 
 I fully understand the thinking behind amendment No. 183, but, again, it is unnecessary. The Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 requires that employers permit officials of recognised trade unions time off during working hours to carry out union activities, including collective bargaining. The purpose of the amendment is already covered in statute and it is unnecessary to duplicate that. 
 With those assurances, I hope that the hon. Member for Teignbridge will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Richard Younger-Ross: I thank the Minister for putting that clearly on the record. I shall have no difficulty in withdrawing my amendment. I accept that the word ''proportionate'' was not intended to be precise to the ninth decimal place; it can mean something that is reasonable rather than exact. We totally accept that a small committee would be more manageable and better. I thank the Minister for his comments and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Philip Hammond: I beg to move amendment No. 111, in
clause 31, page 14, line 5, at end insert 
 'appointed in accordance with advice to the Secretary of State from the Commissioner for Public Appointments.'.
 This is very much a probing amendment. I struggled with the drafting of it and recognise that it is rather inelegant. Indeed, I am not sure that the language is appropriate. I seek an assurance from the Minister that a genuinely independent chairman will be appointed. Independence is defined in subsection (3) by excluding certain categories of people. I can think of lots of people who do not fall into any of those categories but would not be considered independent by the layman. In the context of a Secretary of State-imposed negotiating body, we are looking for someone of unimpeachable standing who is recognised, if not warmly, by all parties involved in the negotiating body as beyond pressure from Ministers or any other party, and as being of a robustness and, perhaps, public standing that would give the body the stature that it needs to be genuinely independent. 
 I imagine that the Minister will be able to tell us whether the advice of the Commissioner for Public Appointments would routinely be sought on such appointments. The amendment seeks to ensure that that advice would be not only sought but listened to. I would be happy to withdraw the amendment if the right hon. Gentleman could assure us that any person appointed as chairman would be someone about whom the Secretary of State had taken advice from the commissioner and that the commissioner had indicated that the person in question was appropriate for appointment. 
 The commissioner does not approve or make appointments, so it was difficult to draft an amendment that makes sense, and it may not work. However, I hope that that Minister will accept the general thrust of the point and provide some reassurance.

Nick Raynsford: The hon. Gentleman quite properly tabled the amendment. He admitted that it may not be drafted in the most professional parliamentary language, but it has the reasonable purpose of obtaining assurances about the process of appointing an independent chair. I assure him and the Committee that the Government regard it as essential that the chair is independent. I also wholly concur with the hon. Gentleman that the person who chairs the body should be of an appropriate stature and character to ensure its effective operation. That is important for the success of the negotiating machinery,.
 We believe that the subsections (2)(c) and (3) will ensure the chairman's independence. The detailed process would be a matter for the regulations. If we decide to establish statutory negotiating machinery, we shall consult appropriately before making the regulations. 
 It is the ODPM's current practice to comply with the principles set out by the Commissioner for Public Appointments, and we would certainly apply those principles in this instance if an appointment was to be made. I hope that, with that assurance, the hon. Gentleman will seek leave to withdraw the amendment.

Philip Hammond: The only caveat that the Minister mentioned there was that it is the ODPM's current
 practice. I hope that he was not suggesting that there might be a change in practice ahead.

Nick Raynsford: If I may repeat what I said, it is our current practice to comply with the principles and it would be our intention to apply them in this instance, if we had to make an appointment. I have to use the conditional tense, because we will not definitely apply this process. If agreement is reached voluntarily in the existing negotiating framework on the creation of a more satisfactory framework, there will be no need for these provisions. The hon. Gentleman should not draw any inference from my use of the conditional tense, other than that it is to guard against the possibility that we never have to use the procedures because agreement is reached through the existing arrangements.

Philip Hammond: I am grateful to the Minister for that clarification and I welcome his assurance that it will be a genuinely independent chairman. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Philip Hammond: I beg to move amendment No. 112, in
clause 31, page 14, line 12, leave out subsections (4), (5) and (6).

Edward O'Hara: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 163, 164 and 165.

Philip Hammond: We tabled amendment No. 112 to probe the way in which the special status given to agreements made by the negotiating bodies worked and to raise some issues about the status of local negotiations, which have long been a part of fire service employment practice and tradition, but which appeared to be outlawed by clause 31.
 That is another issue that has been raised by a number of fire authorities on their initial reading of the Bill. They were clearly able to get to the Minister and the ODPM in double quick time. The amendment, the purpose of which was to draw attention to the issue and to probe the Government's intentions on local negotiating machinery, has been largely obviated by the Government tabling amendments that address those issues and make clear how they intend to proceed. None the less, as a result of the accident of my having tabled the amendment first, I must now go first and ask the questions that the Minister would probably have answered anyway had the order of tabling been different. 
 Government amendment No. 163 answers the charge that there is no recognition in the Bill of local negotiation, but it permits it only to the extent that the negotiating body allows. The Minister will tell me with great pedantry that that is different from the extent to which the Secretary of State allows. However, if he reads the Bill carefully, he will see that in the next clause the negotiating body is bound to have regard to ''guidance'' given to it by the Secretary of State. Therefore, on an issue such as this the end decision rests, in effect, with the Secretary of State. If we cut through the machinery, it is the Secretary of State who will ultimately be in a position to determine the extent to which local negotiation is permitted. 
 Clearly, local negotiation is important to create flexibility in the system and has always been part of the system. Equally, if people felt strongly that the negotiating machinery that had been imposed was oppressive, or that they did not like it in some way, local negotiation could be used as a way of circumventing that negotiating machinery. I think that we are entitled to ask the Minister what the intended scope of local negotiation is. Will it include pay and weighting or only local conditions' issues, perhaps about the location of people's workplace and other such relatively marginal issues? I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about those things. 
 Government amendment No. 164 is welcome because it recognises the weakness of over-centralising the bargaining process by providing for local negotiation. We welcome that. The mechanism, as I have said, reinforces the Secretary of State's power yet again. He dictates to the negotiating body, which authorises the local negotiation in terms that it has defined. That means that there is not a negotiation in the sense that the layman would understand the term. It is a process the scope and breadth of which will be constrained and determined from the top down. 
 Government amendment No. 165 brings great relief to me because I spent more time trying to understand and get advice on the meaning and relevance of subsection (6) than on any other subsection in the whole Bill. I assume that the exclusion of subsection (6), which says that subsection (5)—the subsection that gives exclusive rights to deals made under the negotiating structure to have the protection of legal enforceability—has 
''effect despite section 179 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992'',
 is not a change of policy, but a recognition that there is no conflict between the two. 
 If that is the case, I will have to congratulate the person who advised me way back in the procedure that that was the case. I will also have to confess that a small excursion into the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 reminded me why considering a fire and rescue Bill in Committee is much less hard work than considering an employment relations Bill, one of which I was involved with in a previous incarnation. If the Minister could clarify that there is no practical effect or change of policy direction arising from the elimination of subsection (6), that would be helpful confirmation of my understanding.

Nick Raynsford: I start by saying that we understand the importance of local negotiations in the fire and rescue service. It was never our intention to make the outcome of local negotiations unenforceable. Hon. Members may well, therefore, reasonably inquire why the provisions that we propose to remove from the Bill were included. The original formulation was designed to avoid the effectiveness of any new negotiating machinery that is put in place being subverted by a deliberate ploy to negotiate at a local level, and thereby avoid the national machinery. That was the thinking that led us to the original formulation. Since
 publication of the Bill, we have looked again at the draft, and we have tabled amendments Nos. 163, 164 and 165 to enable local negotiations on certain conditions of service to continue to be legally enforceable.
 The hon. Gentleman asked me which conditions would be open to negotiation. I say to him that we would not see this as extending to pay, because that could subvert the national framework for agreement. In our recent debate, we talked about the benefit of a UK-wide national framework for negotiation on pay. Clearly, it would be inconsistent if we opened the door to local pay negotiations through these amendments.

Philip Hammond: My understanding is that London weighting has been negotiated at a local level, as a local matter. If weighting is allowed to be negotiated at a local level, there is no reason why it could not become a much larger element, which would have a significant impact on pay.

Nick Raynsford: I do not intend to be drawn into too detailed a consideration of the scope for local agreement, as against national agreement, on matters of weighting and any additions that may be made to national agreements. Clearly, this is a very difficult area, and it is probably right that there should be a measure of discretion. However, I can say to the hon. Gentleman that a certain number of items are traditionally negotiated locally, and these can have a significant impact on the level of pay that people will ultimately take home, even if the rates of pay are negotiated nationally. Shift and duty systems, certain redundancy arrangements and mobility and redeployment arrangements have all traditionally been subject to local negotiation, and it is not our intention to cut across those particular elements.

Philip Hammond: I am sure that it is not the Minister's intention, but I think that he is sending the wrong signal here. He is saying that elements other than pay are traditionally negotiated locally and could have a significant impact on take-home pay. That suggests a lack of transparency—a national pay structure, negotiated publicly and nationally, and a series of local arrangements that subvert that in an untransparent way. The use of supplements and dodgy shift arrangements can add to pay in a way that is not transparent. I hope that that is not what the Minister had in mind.
 I ask the Minister specifically about London weighting. It is a significant issue in London, and my understanding is that it has always been negotiated locally. Is he saying that that important local negotiation would not be permitted under this clause?

Nick Raynsford: The hon. Gentleman is quite wrong to assume that I was opening the door to the subversion of national pay negotiations. I was making exactly the opposite point. He will recall that I stressed that the reason for the original formulation of the clause was that it would avoid the scope for subversion of a national agreement. He will know that there is quite widespread variation in practice in terms of shift systems and patterns, and those do affect people's take-home pay. They are subject to local negotiations, and we do not intend to cut across that.
 Indeed, the whole basis of the new policy that underpins the Bill and is part of the integrated risk management planning framework that is coming in, is that local fire and rescue authorities will be free to explore the right responses to risk in their area and to put in place arrangements that respond to them in the most appropriate way. That is the framework that we want.
 There will be scope for local agreement. That would potentially cover local allowances such as London weighting, with the agreement of the new statutory body. That is the key to the new framework. Local discretion will be allowed, but it will be subject to agreement by the new national body to avoid the risk of the national framework being subverted.

Philip Hammond: The Minister will have to accept that, because of the Secretary of State's power to give guidance to the national body, we will want to probe him a little further than just allowing him to say that that will be with the agreement of the national body. Does he envisage the national body putting limits on the scope of local negotiation, for example, limiting weighting arrangements to a certain percentage of pay? Or will he allow negotiations that have taken place locally in the past to continue unfettered?

Nick Raynsford: The hon. Gentleman is confusing two quite separate processes. When we deal with the next clause, we will consider the circumstances in which the Secretary of State may give guidance. There are very good reasons for him doing so, which go back to the Bain report. I remind the hon. Gentleman of the reasons for that review.
 That situation is quite different from what I was talking about a moment ago, which is the procedure under which the new national body, if one is created, with an independent chairman gives an overall framework and agreement to local negotiations. It is designed to ensure a coherent national framework with scope for local negotiations and will not be susceptible to the kind of direction that the hon. Gentleman fears will be given by the Secretary of State.

Philip Hammond: I am curious. I am not sure whether the Minister is saying that the powers under clause 32 would not allow the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the national negotiating body about the extent to which it should allow local negotiation. Surely, that would be precisely the kind of thing on which the Secretary of State would want to reserve the power to give guidance.

Nick Raynsford: We are getting dangerously close to pre-empting the debate on clause 32. I am perfectly happy to discuss the matter now, but I had assumed that it would probably be better to deal with it when we came to that clause.
 It is not the Government's intention for the Secretary of State to be directly involved as a member in the negotiations, although Bain recommended that the Government should be directly involved. We have not gone as far as Bain on that point, nor is it our intention to give directions in the way that the hon. Gentleman indicated, but 
 there is a proper role for guidance to be given by the Secretary of State for reasons that I will set out in full when we come to clause 32. 
 Government amendments Nos. 163 and 164 would allow a statutory negotiating body to make arrangements for local negotiation of particular conditions of service. We have dealt with that. Agreements resulting from those arrangements would be legally enforceable. 
 While reviewing the effect of clause 31, we concluded that subsection (6) did not add anything to the existing legal position. I can reassure the hon. Gentleman that he will not have to do any further quarrying in the infinitely fascinating territory of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. I hope that he will accept my assurance that there is no benefit from subsection (6), which is why we feel that its inclusion is unnecessary and that it can be deleted. Indeed, its inclusion might lead to misinterpretation. Government amendment No. 165 seeks to exclude subsection (6) from the Bill. In doing so, it addresses part of Opposition amendment No. 112. 
 Amendment No. 112 seeks to remove subsections (4) and (5) as well. That would mean that even if a statutory body were established, employers and unions could continue to negotiate legally enforceable agreements outside the statutory negotiating arrangements. I hope that on reflection the hon. Gentleman will recognise that that would not be a desirable framework, that Government amendments Nos. 163 and 164 have dealt with the concerns that were brought to his attention and that the clause as amended will provide a proper framework for the future. I ask him to withdraw the amendment.

Philip Hammond: As I indicated in my opening remarks, Government amendments Nos. 163, 164 and 165 address the issue. I would not have tabled amendment No. 112 if the Government's amendments had already been tabled. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Amendments made: No. 163, in 
clause 31, page 14, line 21, after 'body' insert 
 'or in accordance with local negotiation arrangements made by the negotiating body in respect of employees of that description'.
 No. 164, in 
clause 31, page 14, line 21, at end insert— 
 '(5A) ''Local negotiation arrangements'' means arrangements made by a negotiating body established under this section for the purpose of enabling conditions of service of employees of fire and rescue authorities to be negotiated at local level. 
 (5B) Local negotiation arrangements may (in particular) include provision with regard to— 
 (a) the persons or descriptions of persons by whom, or by means of whom, negotiations are authorised to be carried out at local level; 
 (b) the conditions of service and descriptions of conditions of service authorised to be negotiated at local level. 
 (5C) Local negotiation arrangements may be made by a negotiating body in respect of employees of a particular description only if the negotiating body includes persons representing the interests of employees of that description.'.
 No. 165, in 
clause 31, page 14, line 22, leave out subsection (6).—[Mr. Raynsford.]
 Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Philip Hammond: This is an important clause. We have already explored some of the issues relating to it. During the dispute there was a feeling that the Government were the spectre at the feast—I could put that point more aggressively, but I am in a relaxed mood this afternoon. [Interruption.] I will not be emollient as the Minister suggests, but I will not be aggressive. It was felt that the Government were party to the negotiations, but without taking any responsibility for their role. Negotiations progressed and civil servants were hovering in the wings—sometimes not so much in the wings—making known what the Deputy Prime Minister would find acceptable. Every time Ministers were challenged about the progress of the negotiations, they simply retreated behind the mantra that they were the responsibility of the employee representatives and the local authority employers, with Government as mere bystanders.
 I understand why the Minister is reluctant to go down the route expressed by Bain and become a full party to the negotiations because it is much more comfortable to stand in the wings with all sorts of reserve powers that can be deployed, while being able to deny any responsibility for the progress—or lack of it—that takes place. We have to look at the structure in the round and envisage how it would work in the context of another dispute where employers and employees are negotiating and the Government are not a party to those negotiations but are able to give guidance that has to be taken into account. Some may say that that merely formalises the situation that occurred during the last dispute, where Government guidance in practice, as we saw in one or two of those famous moments of brinkmanship, turned out to be the determining factor. 
 I want to touch on the issue that would have been raised had amendment Nos. 109 and 110 been accepted. To some extent, the Minister has already addressed some of the concerns. Amendment No. 109 would have raised the issue of whether the reference to one or more bodies in subsection (1) was appropriate. The Bill refers to one or more bodies being established, and I thought that there must be a distinction between one body and more than one. Therefore, by removing the reference to one or more, I would be probing the Minister as to whether his intention was to create one body or more than one. However, I have subsequently been advised that ''bodies'' incorporates the concept of a single body, which does for my amendment, but also raises an interesting question about the Bill's drafting because it appears to contain redundant words. Since the advice that the phrase ''one or more bodies'' and the phrase ''bodies'' in line 37 mean precisely the same thing came from a reliable source, I am bound to ask why the Bill refers to ''one or more bodies''. Since the phrase does not add anything—we are authoritatively told—it must be there to send a message of some description. I am at a loss to understand precisely the 
 message that the Minister intends to send by using now officially redundant words. He told us that his inclination, which is set out in the White Paper, is to have three negotiating bodies for different horizontal strata of the service, so why the reference to ''one or more bodies''? 
 We welcome the late recognition of local negotiation and the belated clarification about the complexities of applying the 1992 Act. We also welcome the mechanics that he is putting in place to ensure that only matters negotiated through a Secretary of State-created body could be legally enforced. 
 Is the Minister sure that the arrangements ruling out enforceability of contracts freely entered into between consenting adults outside arrangements approved by him do not offend any measures, such as the human rights legislation or our compliance with International Labour Organisation agreements or procedures? As he will remember, they were much referred to during our debates on the Fire Services Act 2003, although not by me. 
 I addressed the other Minister on subsection (7). The Bill's architecture means that at the end of many of its clauses a subsection states: 
''Before making regulations under this section the Secretary of State must consult any persons he considers appropriate.''
 The wording is very strange, because to require someone to do something that they consider appropriate does not appear to me to require them to do anything at all. I would prefer a much more objective test of persons to be consulted: any persons who appear to the Secretary of State to be affected by the regulations, or any persons representing affected persons would be sensible. He ''must consult'' is rather meaningless. I have not seen that wording in a Bill before and I wonder why it has been chosen. 
 In more practical terms, will the Minister tell us whom he expects to consult if he were making regulations under the clause? We might then have a clue about who would be included and excluded. Rather alarmingly, the Under-Secretary told us that the Secretary of State might or might not think it appropriate to consult a trade union actively involved in an industrial dispute when consulting on directions for purposes of public safety during a dispute. I might be quite hostile to the position that the union has taken, but I would hardly think it inappropriate to consult someone engaged in the dispute. I can imagine that the Secretary of State—a protagonist—might take a different view at the time. That is why I seek a more objective requirement for consultation.

Richard Younger-Ross: Two issues arise from amendment No. 109, which we have not been able to debate for what I accept are perfectly good reasons. They are the terms and conditions and the status of retained firefighters.
 The White Paper stated in paragraph 8.27: 
''A major problem for the fire and rescue service is the recruitment of retained firefighters. Nationally it is about 20 per cent. short of complement. . . . The recruitment problems stem in part from the level of pay, the lack of a pension, the lack of 
development opportunities and the often inflexible availability system—in short, a lack of recognition of their contribution.''
 After considering the White Paper and taking evidence, the Select Committee made a number of positive recommendations. One was that local government should set a good example by allowing flexible working, and another related to entitlement to paid leave. 
 The purpose of the amendment that we cannot debate was to encourage the Minister to give us his views on the status of retained firefighters and their pay and conditions. We believe that it is wrong that a retained firefighter, of which there are many in my home county of Devon, fights fires alongside a full-time firefighter, but earns far less. I know that that leads to resentment among some—not all—retained firefighters. The Government and the Select Committee recognise that that is a contributory factor in our inability to recruit enough retained firefighters. I therefore hope that the Minister can expand on the Government's thinking on firefighters' pay and conditions and on what he hopes for from the negotiating body on that issue. 
 Finally, the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge asked about London weighting. There is a major issue about how those in the essential services, such as firefighters—retained or full-time—can afford accommodation. Does the Minister envisage that the new negotiating body will be able to assist firefighters in finding accommodation? If so, that would be a way to deal with the shortage in some areas.

Nick Raynsford: Clause 31 provides the Secretary of State with reserve powers to establish one or more new negotiating bodies and to determine their membership and chairs following consultation.
 The fire and rescue service needs negotiating machinery that is effective and fit for purpose. In the June 2003 pay agreement both sides agreed to review the current negotiating arrangements, and that review is under way. The powers proposed in the clause provide the opportunity to put effective negotiating machinery in place if the review does not deliver improved arrangements. However, as I have made clear here and in many other places, we want the existing negotiating framework to lead to a voluntary agreement. The reserve powers are to be used only if that does not prove possible.

Philip Hammond: What time scales are involved here? We are all aware of the discussions taking place, adjourning and starting up again. How long will they be allowed to run before the Secretary of State decides to establish machinery because a voluntary agreement is not possible?

Nick Raynsford: The hon. Gentleman was in his current post throughout the period of the dispute and is aware that anyone who sets a timetable probably runs a serious risk of being disappointed. As we know, the negotiations proved protracted. I would not want to put an arbitrary time limit on these complex and difficult discussions. We have expressed the view that a voluntary agreement should be the first and preferred route, but that if that fails there will be statutory provision. Until the Bill receives Royal Assent, scope
 for statutory provision is no more than an aspiration. In the absence of the powers, it would be wrong to be too precise about the timetable. However, the hon. Gentleman may reasonably infer that once the powers have been enacted, if there has not been satisfactory progress or the prospect of it, it will become more likely that attention will be given to using the powers to create new and more effective machinery.

Philip Hammond: Once the Bill has received Royal Assent, assuming it gets that far—[Laughter.] The Minister may laugh, but he would be well advised to remember that Bills must go through two Houses of Parliament. Although he might laugh in this place, he sometimes has to laugh on the other side of his collective face in the other place. The serious question that I want to ask is whether the existing machinery can survive the demise of the 1947 Act and the enactment of the Bill. Is there any part of the existing negotiating machinery that depends on any part of the 1947 Act structure?

Nick Raynsford: My understanding is that if a voluntary agreement is reached to replace the existing NJC arrangements with new ones that satisfy the conditions that we have set out as objectives, that can happen without the requirement for a new statutory underpinning, but this is a technical issue on which I would prefer to seek further advice before giving a definitive response.
 The hon. Gentleman asked how the provisions would change the framework from that which applied during the dispute that occurred last year and the year before. The answer is that the Government were in a curious position throughout that dispute, because unlike in every other major area of public service, there was no provision for us to indicate through the negotiating procedures the overall financial framework within which both employers and employees would need to negotiate. As he will recall, as a result, there were one or two moments when it was suggested that highly inflationary settlements had been agreed, imposing huge additional costs on fire and rescue authorities, which did not have the means to meet them. Inevitably, they would have come to the Government and said, ''Can we have more money to meet these costs?'' 
 Against that background, it is only reasonable that the Government should have the ability to inform the negotiations by setting out in advance a proper framework of understanding showing what employees and employers can expect in terms of financial subvention from the Government. Anyone who suggests otherwise is frankly living in a world of fantasy. It is precisely to address the problems of the failings of the former machinery that we have proposed these changes. 
 The hon. Gentleman went on to ask about the significance of the phrasing and the reference to ''one or more bodies''. The Interpretation Act 1978 gives us helpful guidance. It tells us that the singular includes the plural except when the context indicates otherwise. I am not sure that that leads us any further forward. However, that is the correct interpretation of the provision. We included the plural to avoid any possible doubt. In line with what I said earlier, our 
 view is that there probably should be three separate bodies, which would represent: chief fire officers and assistant chief fire officers; middle managers; and firefighters and control room staff. 
 The hon. Gentleman asked whether local agreements might not be consistent with human rights legislation, with International Labour Organisation agreements, and with the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.

Philip Hammond: Perhaps I did not express myself clearly. My question was whether the exclusion of agreements not reached through machinery sanctioned by the Secretary of State might offend those conventions and arrangements. One can readily imagine—not, of course, in this context, but in that of other, less benign nations and regimes—a situation where Government-sanctioned negotiating machinery having an exclusive right to negotiate enforceable labour agreements might be regarded with a sideways look. I wonder how the Minister has been able to assure himself that measures designed to deal with despotic regimes do not bite on a Government-sanctioned negotiating machinery.

Nick Raynsford: The hon. Gentleman will probably recall the years when his party was in government, and no doubt that was what prompted his reference to despotic regimes.
 It is our approach to avoid unnecessary confrontation, to ensure that there is a sensible framework for resolving disputes in a way that avoids disruptive strike action, such as occurred in the fire service 18 months ago, and to ensure that the negotiating machinery works properly. I am advised that there is nothing in the provisions of the Bill that would in any way disapply the requirements of other legislation, including that relating to human rights and the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. 
 The hon. Gentleman asked why the phrasing 
''the Secretary of State must consult any persons he considers appropriate''
 is included in the consultation obligations. The problem with any over-precise definition of obligations to consult is that it leaves scope for litigation if parties who believe that they should have been included are not. Inevitably, in a sensitive situation, it is desirable not to take the list approach, which we have debated on previous occasions. That can have the perverse consequence of implying that organisations that are not included in the list should be excluded, when that is not the intention; they were simply not thought of at the time the list was compiled. The other unsatisfactory outcome is a very general definition that is open to widespread interpretation and potential litigation. 
 Against that background, it seems entirely proper that the Secretary of State—who has indicated clearly, throughout the dispute and subsequently, his wish to consult and involve all parties—has had regular meetings with the full range of parties involved. The Under-Secretary and I have also been involved in 
 discussions with many of the parties involved and will continue to be involved. That is our intention. We have a positive approach to consultation, and the wording of the Bill allows some discretion without vulnerability to litigation. I would have thought that the hon. Gentleman would recognise that that is appropriate. 
 The hon. Member for Teignbridge asked about the position of retained firefighters. I assure him that the Government is determined that retained firefighters should have full recognition and should be treated in a way that ensures parity with full-time firefighters. Obviously there are variations in terms of the conditions, because retained firefighters also receive a retainer and a fee for individual call-out. There has to be a proper framework for reaching agreement about what the balance of those components should be and how that relates to the position of full-time firefighters. The principle of parity, though, is one that we agree with. 
 We believe that retained firefighters perform a hugely important role. It is right that they should have certainty and confidence. As the hon. Gentleman rightly highlighted, that may help recruitment in those areas where there is a shortage of retained firefighters. The service's only recruitment difficulties are for retained firefighters, and we want to ensure that practical steps are taken to help overcome those problems. 
 As far as involvement in the negotiating processes is concerned, the hon. Gentleman will know from my earlier answers that we have made it absolutely clear that we want representatives of retained firefighters to be involved. Some are represented by the Fire Brigades Union and some are represented by the retained firefighters union, but we believe that both representative bodies should be able to play a full part in the negotiating machinery, and we have made that quite clear. 
 The hon. Gentleman raised a question about accommodation for firefighters. He will know that our initiative to provide opportunities for affordable housing for key public sector workers—the starter home initiative—has provided some genuine opportunities for a range of public sector workers. There is indeed a possibility that that will extend to cover certain groups of firefighters. I am keen that that should be the case. We are well aware of the issue of accommodation. 
 With those remarks, I hope that hon. Members will agree that clause 31 is an important new component that allows the Secretary of State to act if necessary to ensure that there are appropriate negotiating arrangements in place in future that will remedy the deficiencies that were highlighted during the dispute of 2002–03, and will improve enormously the working of the negotiating arrangements for pay and conditions issues in the fire and rescue service. I hope that hon. Members will agree that clause 31 as amended should stand part of the Bill. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 31, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 32 - Guidance

Philip Hammond: I beg to move amendment No. 113, in
clause 32, page 14, line 31, leave out subsection (2).

Edward O'Hara: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 114, in 
clause 32, page 14, line 39, leave out from 'constituted' to 'negotiation' in line 40 and insert 'for the purpose of'.

Philip Hammond: We move on to clause 32, which deals with the guidance that the Secretary of State may issue. We are quite used to perversion of the language being an inevitable by-product of some parliamentary drafting, but the clause does not deal with guidance in the sense that most people would understand the meaning of the word. The Secretary of State is able to issue guidance to which the negotiating body must have regard. That is not a gentle steer, it is a clear requirement to do or not to do something.
 Amendment No. 113 would remove subsection (2). Subsection (2) states that the negotiating bodies must have regard to any guidance issued under the clause. By removing the subsection, the guidance becomes guidance: an indication of what the Secretary of State feels is appropriate. It would be a steer rather than something that has to be had regard to when the negotiation process is under way. It is consistent with the approach that I have taken throughout the Bill that we have to defend the independence of the fire and rescue authorities as separate employers. They are not a branch of central Government. The extent of the arrangements gives the Secretary of State effective control of the negotiating procedure without being directly a part of it. 
 Amendment No. 114 would introduce a more objective test of whether a negotiating body is such a body under the terms of the Bill. At the moment, the definition of a negotiating body in subsection (3)(b) places great weight on whether the arrangements under which that body is constituted 
''appear to the Secretary of State to be appropriate arrangements for the negotiation of the conditions of service of employees''.
 The amendment would seek to reduce that to a requirement that the body is constituted for the purpose of negotiation of the conditions of employment of those employees. In other words, it would be a recognition of the de facto situation. If a body is, de facto, a body representing employees in the negotiating process, it should be recognised as a negotiating body under the provisions. 
 I think that that is all I want to say at the moment, other than to note that the Secretary of State determining that the constitution of a body is appropriate is not the same as a test that requires a body to be constituted in the customary way for such a body. The requirement seems to be highly arbitrary and I hope that the Minister will say something about the purpose of this curiously phrased subsection.

Nick Raynsford: I am afraid that the Opposition have again wholly distorted the purpose of the clause. The preposterous claim that they are somehow defending the independence of the fire and rescue authorities against an over-mighty Government does not accord with reality in any way. If Opposition Members had any experience of the pay negotiating arrangements for comparative public sector bodies, they would realise that the role of the Secretary of State that we envisage in the Bill is far less than in the police negotiations, in which the Home Secretary plays a full part in the negotiating machinery, in the teachers' negotiations, in which the Secretary of State for Education and Skills decides the final outcome for teachers, and in many others. It is preposterous of the Conservative party to claim that this is a centralising measure. It responds to the sensible conclusions of the Bain report to which the Conservative party signed up when they were published 15 or 16 months ago. Conservative Members were full of praise for Bain then, but now, conveniently, they have forgotten.
 I shall remind Conservative Members of what Professor Sir George Bain and his team concluded. They were pretty trenchant in their views and stated: 
''The current strike seems to demonstrate that the negotiating machinery is ineffective. And during the course of this Review, the evidence we have seen and the discussions we have had have confirmed this view.
Its ineffectiveness can be attributed to a number of factors, including its unwieldy size and its lack of any clear relationship with central government and the policy-making process.
We recommend that the NJC should be replaced by a smaller body, with executive authority to negotiate and the experience and skills to do so. It should include working parties to pursue individual issues, reporting back to the main body, or even standing sub-committees. There should be clear links with Ministers and the policy-making process so that pay and conditions of service fit into context of wider modernisation.''
 When they suggested how the negotiating process should proceed in paragraph 10.28, their very first point was: 
''Government lays down the policy framework for the Fire Service. This could include annual evidence on pay policy (just like evidence to the Pay Review Bodies).''

Philip Hammond: Will the Minister give way?

Nick Raynsford: Let the hon. Gentleman listen for a little longer and I will then give way.
 That was the Bain recommendation. In our White Paper we set out precisely how we intended to implement those recommendation. Paragraph 7.14 states, 
''we intend to take powers to give guidance to any negotiating body which it would have to take into account in its work. The government has a legitimate interest in the outcome of pay negotiations and the impact on public sector pay policy, as well as the impact on the operation of the service, but we should not and do not want to step into the shoes of the fire and rescue authorities as employers. Rather than be drawn into detailed consideration of options as negotiations develop, we will set out our requirements openly before negotiations start. It will then be for the two sides to reach agreement within those limits.''
 That is the framework we are putting in place and that is a sensible and responsible way forward. The Opposition's position is, frankly, not credible.

Philip Hammond: The Minister, as so often, quote the parts of the Bain report that suit him. He told the Committee not half an hour ago that Bain had recommended that the Government should be a full party to the negotiations. He does not want that. He does not want to take the rap for what goes on in the negotiating machinery. He does not want to be responsible. He wants to stand in the wings with powers to issue guidance, which the negotiating body must follow, but be able to stand back, as he did on that fateful Friday morning back in November 2002, and say ''It's nothing to do with me guv, it's about employers and employees negotiating together.'' I would say to the Minister that he should not quote the bits of Bain that suit him without acknowledging that Bain recommended that the Government should take a full, responsible part in the pay negotiations and not merely stand in the wings.

Nick Raynsford: I have to say to the hon. Gentleman that he could not describe anyone more clearly than himself and his party when he talks about standing in the wings and behaving irresponsibly. This Government will take no lessons from the party opposite in handling the firefighters dispute during 2002 and 2003. If the Government had not adopted the stance they did, the hon. Gentleman would now be complaining about the impact of inflationary pay settlements on council tax. We would be hearing a great deal about that from the party opposite. This Government stepped in, in difficult circumstances—as I have already highlighted, there was no proper framework for the Government to be involved, as Bain rightly identified in his report—and we insisted that there must be a clear framework for affordability of any settlement. That is the action of a responsible Government, and it is why we are now putting in place arrangements to ensure that before negotiations begin, the Government spell out the framework in guidance to the negotiating body.
 The hon. Gentleman wants to have it both ways. He claims that this is a centralising Government, stepping in and telling the negotiators what to do. He talked about acting to defend the independence of fire and rescue authorities, yet in the next breath he said that we should have been a party to the negotiations. How can he reconcile those two statements? Of course, he cannot. This is an opportunistic Opposition who say one thing at one moment, and another at the next, simply in order to criticise, and not to behave as a responsible Opposition do, which is to try and ensure that there is an appropriate framework in place, allowing improved procedures in future. 
 I must say that the suggestion that the Secretary of State should be free to issue guidance, but that the body concerned would not have to have regard to it, which is the effect of one of the hon. Gentleman's amendments, is a classic illustration of the irresponsibility and lack of realism of the party opposite. They clearly do not expect to be in government for a very long time. No party that did would be putting forward such ridiculous amendments. These amendments do not deserve any further serious consideration. I hope that if the hon. Gentleman presses them, they will be decisively 
 rejected, but I actually hope that, in the interests of common sense, he will recognise that they are entirely inappropriate and should be withdrawn.

Philip Hammond: There comes a time in every Bill—and it is usually about this stage—when the Minister starts to try to raise the temperature again, because otherwise things flag a little. I normally measure that point in the Bill by how many times per sitting he uses the term ''preposterous''. It is one of his key expressions when stating his views on Opposition positions. I do not see anything preposterous about what I have said today. I thought I was being the opposite of preposterous. What is preposterous is for the Minister now, in the peacetime of 2004, to start abusing the Opposition for the support that we gave the Government during the dispute. The Minister may smile, but he recognises that the Opposition did not take the many chances available during the dispute to be opportunistic, and expressed considerable support for what the Government were doing over that period of time.

Edward O'Hara: Order. I have let the hon. Gentleman make that point, but we should return to the point in hand.

Philip Hammond: On the point of guidance I am alarmed at the Minister's suggestion that Governments and parties that seek to be in Government would always support centralising legislation. I can tell him that my party expects to be in government and looks forward to governing over a more decentralised form of management of our public sector institutions, whether they be hospitals, police forces or fire services. Therefore, I am slightly alarmed by some of the things that the Minister has said.
 As I read it, the Bain report said that the Government must either be in or be out. Bain clearly had a preference for the Government being in, believing that they should be a full part of the negotiating machinery. I believe that what happened last time was unsatisfactory. The Minister may concur with that. The Government cannot hover in the wings—I cannot think of another way to describe it—either in the negotiating room or apart from the negotiations, exercising a veto but not being responsible for the outcome. 
 The role of the word ''guidance'' in this context is somewhat ironic. I am thinking now of hot guidance, if I may call it that. The Minister has painted a picture of guidance purely as a framework drawn up in advance of a negotiation, setting parameters. He sought to deflect attention from the possibility that I see in the clause that during the progress of a negotiation, indeed in the middle of the night, the Secretary of State could issue guidance to the negotiating body. 
 In his own mind the Minister may have a different view about how this will work, because he is privy to the machinations of his own mind. We are not; we can only look at what is in the Bill. I see nothing in the clause that would prevent the Deputy Prime Minister from ringing up the negotiating body when it is ensconced in a hotel in Holborn, or wherever, at 
 4 o'clock in the morning and issuing it with guidance. That is the kind of guidance that concerns me. It is clearly different from the type that the Minister depicts as wholly benign, a measured mapping out in advance by the Secretary of State of the parameters and financeability of a potential, negotiated solution. I have seen no indication that the Minister wants to rule out the possibility of the Secretary of State issuing on-the-hoof guidance during a negotiation, as occurred during the last negotiation, with ministerial guidance—informal guidance, because it had no statutory backing—being conveyed by civil servants to the negotiating body while it was in progress.

Nick Raynsford: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will recall the context of that meeting. In a framework in which the Government had no role in the negotiating procedure, in the middle of the night the parties appeared to be on the point of reaching an agreement that would have allowed a 16 per cent. pay increase, with no link to modernisation and no way of ensuring that savings would be made to help to meet the costs. No responsible Government could face that prospect, which was at considerable variance with what had previously been envisaged, without offering guidance about the affordability of such a package and the fact that the Government could not be expected to stump up the cash to pay for that deal. That was why the Government had to respond. It is precisely to avoid such an eventuality that, in accordance with the clear principles set out in the Bain report, which envisaged the Government starting the process by laying down the policy framework, we are now legislating to allow for an orderly offer of guidance to inform the negotiating process.

Philip Hammond: I wanted to intervene on the Minister, but then I realised that he was intervening on me. Now that I have resumed the Floor, I can ask him whether he rules out the use of guidance under the clause during a negotiation. Does he limit the guidance to be given under the clause to advance, broad-framework guidance?

Nick Raynsford: Of course not, because in circumstances such as those that occurred in November 2002 guidance is clearly necessary. As I have already stressed, our objective is to set the framework for negotiations with guidance from the Secretary of State on the broad parameters that the parties will need to consider in negotiations over public sector pay policy and affordability. That is much more orderly, and that is what we are providing for.

Philip Hammond: I thought that I heard the Minister say earlier that if he could set out guidance in advance there would be no need for the middle-of-the-night guidance that he was forced to provide before. We are making little headway and we will once again have to trust the goodwill or judgment of whoever occupies the office of Deputy Prime Minister when the next negotiations or problems arise. I hoped for something more concrete, but I will not delay the Committee any further as we have progress to make.

Jim Knight: Hear, hear.

Philip Hammond: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his encouragement. We have not had a contribution from him today—most unusual and most disappointing. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Philip Hammond: I want to probe the Minister on one issue, for which there may be an explanation. The scope of subsection (3) extends to not only a negotiating body established under clause 31, but any other body appearing to the Secretary of State to have been established in accordance with appropriate arrangements. If we are dealing with a third-party body, which is not established by the Secretary of State and therefore not constrained by clause 31, how are we to enforce the requirement on that body to have regard to guidance given by the Secretary of State?

Nick Raynsford: That is simply the consequence of the chosen way of proceeding that I have already explained to the Committee. The Government want to encourage a voluntary agreement, in which case, as long as we were satisfied that the arrangements meet the conditions of subsection (3), the body would be treated in the same way as a body constituted by the Secretary of State. We will use the provisions of clause 31 to constitute separate arrangements only where those arrangements do not arise. Guidance has to allow for either circumstance, which is the reason for the wording in subsection (3).

Philip Hammond: If a body constituted by the Secretary of State that has to have regard to guidance failed to do so, he could deal with it because he constituted it. If a body that he has not constituted failed in his view to have regard to his guidance, what would he do? Would he have to use the powers in clause 31 to derecognise it and create a new body?

Nick Raynsford: As the hon. Gentleman will understand, the Secretary of State can pull certain levers, including financial support to the fire and rescue service that is provided overwhelmingly by the Government. They would be applied if there were a serious disregard for guidance, leading, for example, to a highly inflationary pay settlement. However there is no explicit provision for taking action if a negotiating party or body does not have regard to the Secretary of State's advice.

Philip Hammond: I am grateful to the Minister. I believe that he is confirming that there is not a sense in which action could be taken against the body for breach of its obligation, but there is an obligation placed on the body, which
''must have regard to any guidance''.
 If I were a negotiating body established not by any statutory process but by a discussion that I had had informally with other parties, and the Secretary of State chose to recognise me as being an acceptable negotiating body—that is something that he would do unilaterally—I would object to the requirement that I had to have regard to guidance from the Secretary of 
 State merely because he had unilaterally decided that he wished to recognise me. 
 If the Minister is telling the Committee that the Secretary of State will use his considerable financial leverage, one is bound to ask why we need the clause at all. He has such leverage and, as we saw, used it in the course of the last dispute.

Nick Raynsford: The hon. Gentleman recognises that that is the current framework, but it is very messy. The whole purpose of these arrangements is to put in place a more orderly system to ensure that the kind of difficulties that occurred during the dispute of 2002–03 are not repeated. I would have thought that he would have welcomed that.

Philip Hammond: Of course, I would welcome avoiding the kind of unnecessary and messy dispute that took place. [Interruption.] The Minister says, ''Mmm.'' Perhaps he should have thought of that in the spring and early summer of 2002. We have an answer to the question of how guidance would be enforced against a body other than one constituted under clause 31: there is no formal process, and it would be done by informal means. That perfectly adequate answer tells me what I wanted to know. I am grateful to the Minister for making that clear.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 32 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Richard Younger-Ross: On a point of order, Mr. O'Hara. I wonder whether in consideration of the next set of amendments you might allow a stand part debate on the clause. Given the time, there will be no debate on some of the broader issues, and they will be lost.

Edward O'Hara: We will just have to see how we go.Clause 33 Pensions etc

Clause 33 - Pensions etc

Philip Hammond: I beg to move amendment No. 115, in
clause 33, page 15, line 8, leave out subsection (1)(b).

Edward O'Hara: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Government amendment No. 166. 
 Amendment No. 116, in 
clause 33, page 15, line 12, leave out subsection (2)(b).
 Amendment No. 117, in 
clause 33, page 15, line 23, leave out subsection (2)(f).
 Amendment No. 118, in 
clause 33, page 15, line 25, leave out subsection (2)(g).
 Amendment No. 119, in 
clause 33, page 15, line 41, after 'made', insert 'and accepted'.
 Government amendment No. 167.

Philip Hammond: Pensions are a major issue for the fire and rescue services. [Interruption.] If the hon. Member for Teignbridge wishes to intervene, I will happily take his intervention.

Richard Younger-Ross: If pensions are such an important issue, why has the hon. Gentleman filibustered all afternoon, leaving us only 17 minutes to discuss them?

Philip Hammond: With the greatest respect to the hon. Gentleman, he wants to be very careful about the language that he uses. No one has filibustered. If anyone had attempted to, Mr. O'Hara, you would certainly have dealt with them with your customary firm hand. If the hon. Gentleman has a problem with the timetable, I suggest that he address himself to the Government Whip, not to Opposition Members. There are two more sittings of this Committee. Most of the remaining clauses are entirely uncontentious, and the amendments are almost exclusively probing or minor amendments. I cannot see that there will be any difficulty in reaching the end of the Bill in the total time available to us. If the hon. Gentleman has a problem with the knife that has been inserted at 5 pm tonight, he must take that up with the Government.
 Turning to the question in hand, pensions are a major issue and all fire and rescue services are concerned about the way in which the pension system operates. The Minister has circulated a helpful memorandum on the subject, but I believe that even he would acknowledge that we are not much further forward at present. It is clear that there must be changes to the pension system. The Bill provides a framework to enable that, but my reading of the memorandum is that beyond the broad principles, or aspirations, we are not very far forward in producing the mechanisms that will be deployed to address the problem. 
 I note, however, that it is intended that firefighters will continue to be dealt with separately from control room and other non-uniformed staff in respect of pensions and pay negotiations. Does the Under-Secretary believe that to some extent that undermines the sensible attempt that the Bill makes to get fire safety and prevention work and community fire education work on a level footing with intervention, as a core part of the fire and rescue service's responsibilities? 
 As I think everyone concedes, in future firefighters will have to stay in a fire authority's employment for longer. They will not be able to retire at 55, because the world has changed; this is no longer a world in which we can afford to have people retiring at 55. However, it is likely that an increasing number of firefighters will want, at the end of their working lives, to do a period of service in duties other than front-line firefighting. That seems sensible, but we will have to address the issue that pay negotiating arrangements and pension schemes will be different. It is vital to ensure that retained firefighters also have access to the pension scheme. I am pleased that the Government specifically acknowledge that in the memorandum. 
 Again it falls to me to second-guess the reasoning behind Government amendments Nos. 166 and 167, but first I want to apologise to the Committee for the style of our amendments. I am a great opponent of the lazy opposition school of amending, in which ''leave 
 out subsection (x)'' is the preferred form. However, in this case, because subsection (2) has paragraphs (a) to (l), the best way to raise specific issues is to propose leaving out a paragraph so that the Under-Secretary can explain why it needs to be there. 
 Amendment No. 115 was tabled with the aim of asking two questions. First, why is there a lack of symmetry between subsection (1)(a) and subsection (1)(b)? Paragraph (a) clearly refers to people who have been employed, but paragraph (b) does not refer to people who have died. The Government have now addressed that issue by tabling amendment No. 166, which, using the past tense, refers explicitly to people who have died. 
 Secondly, why is paragraph (b) necessary at all? Clearly a person who dies, or has died, while employed by a fire and rescue authority or a Scottish fire authority is also, by definition, a person who is or has been employed by that authority. Every person who falls within paragraph (b) will also fall within paragraph (a), so unless I am missing something, paragraph (b) is redundant. I wonder whether there was a particular reason for including it. 
 Amendment No. 116 would delete subsection (2)(b), which allows employment that is not employment by a fire and rescue authority to be treated as if it were. That is very wide in its scope. The memorandum that the Minister has circulated makes it clear that the subsection deals principally with firefighters who transfer away from operational duties. However, it seems to me that they remain employees of a fire and rescue authority. As I understand it, this subsection is not to deal with firefighters who transfer into non-operational duties with the fire and rescue authority; it can only be to deal with issues relating to firefighters who have ceased to be employed by the fire and rescue authority, because the overarching definition is, as I understand it, ''employee of a fire and rescue authority''. So, I would like the Under-Secretary to tell me what employment he has in mind in subsection (2)(b), which provides for 
''treating employment that is not employment by a fire and rescue authority''
 as such employment. 
 Amendment Nos. 117 and 118 seek to leave out subsections (2)(f) and (2)(g) respectively. Those paragraphs give the Secretary of State powers to step into the shoes of a fire and rescue authority and to receive or make payments on behalf of the authority or in respect of a person's past employment. Many authorities would be delighted if the Secretary of State decided to step into their shoes and take over their pension obligations. I strongly suspect that he has no intention of doing so on a general basis. So, before too many bottles of champagne are broken out in authorities throughout the country, perhaps the Under-Secretary could explain the intended purpose and scope of the provisions. 
 Amendment No. 119 deals with subsection (2)(k) and a specific point that I hope will not be contentious. The paragraph provides for the exclusion or modification of 
''rights to compensation or damages in respect of injuries, in cases where awards are made under the scheme''
 that the Secretary of State will put in place to persons 
''in respect of the injuries''.
 The amendment seeks to make it clear that those must be awards that are made and accepted. I take it that the intention is that this is not a unilateral arrangement whereby the making of an award by the scheme or by the employer, without reference to whether the employee accepts the award, precludes or limits the possibility of seeking rights to compensation or damages. It would be helpful if the Under-Secretary could confirm that. 
 I dealt with the Government amendment by referring to it earlier, because it largely addresses the purpose of amendment No. 115. I hope that the Under-Secretary can respond to the other part of its purpose.

Phil Hope: By way of introduction, it may be helpful to explain the intention of the clause. It re-enacts existing powers in section 26 of the 1947 Act, which allows the Secretary of State to bring into operation pensions schemes for persons employed by a fire or rescue authority or by a Scottish fire authority. We referred to schemes in the plural so that there is no doubt that, as well as bringing in the new pension arrangements that we believe are necessary for the new, modernised fire and rescue service, we can retain the existing scheme and have a separate scheme for death and injury benefits.

Richard Younger-Ross: One of the problems faced by the present pension scheme is that its funding comes out of revenue. Does the Under-Secretary have any proposals to change that for the existing scheme, so that fire authorities do not have it coming out of their revenue every year?

Phil Hope: I will come to that point in due course.
 The third scheme will be required because we need to separate out death and injury benefits resulting from work-related incidents from the pension arrangements, both in the current and any future pension scheme. It is no longer considered permissible under existing pension legislation to include compensation arrangements in a new pension scheme. We are reviewing pension arrangements and aim to publish our proposals for change for public consultation in June. 
 The reference to Scotland is necessary because, although firefighting and fire safety have been devolved to Scotland since 1947, pensions remain a reserved matter. We deal in clause 60 with the application of clauses 33 to 35 to Scotland. Subsection (2) sets out the matters that may be included in a scheme made under subsection (1), including such matters as who may be members, the transfer arrangements for people joining the scheme from another scheme, contribution rates for employees and employers and payment of compensation or damages in respect of injuries. It also, at paragraph (e), enables new funding arrangements to be established. That is, I think, what the hon. Member for Teignbridge is concerned about. Firefighters' pensions are currently paid from revenue, and 
 pension contributions are treated as revenue by fire and rescue authorities. Central Government revenue support grant reflects year-on-year increases in those pension costs, but it is based on average costs across the country rather than the actual spend of an authority. 
 The problem for fire and rescue authorities, which also arises for police authorities, is that there is volatility in pensions expenditure caused, for example, by the uneven incidence of lump sum retirement payments. That was considered in 2001, and possible solutions were identified. We will be considering those in the context of the modernisation programme. As a consequence, we are providing for an extension of the matters which may be included in any scheme to cover the provision of employer contributions and the payment of contributions into a fund. We can then make different arrangements for financing and funding pensions if that appears, following consultation, to be the best practical solution to the present problems confronting authorities in financing pensions. 
 Amendments Nos. 166 and 167 remedy a small omission in the Bill. We need to retain the powers that the Secretary of State already has under section 16 of the Superannuation Act 1972 in relation to pension schemes made by order under section 26 of the Fire Services Act 1947. Section 16 allows for any scheme made under the 1947 Act to have effect from a date earlier than the making of the order, so we need to ensure that orders made under clause 33(3) can operate on the same basis. That enables us to remedy, for example, any defect in the pension scheme which may become apparent as a consequence of a decision of the courts, perhaps in relation to another pension scheme, or where consultation has delayed amendments necessitated by changes in pension law more generally. I commend the amendments to the Committee. 
 I turn now to the amendment No. 115 tabled by the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. The purpose of subsection (1)(b) is to enable any scheme made under the clause to make provision for the payment of pensions, allowances and gratuities in respect of persons who die while employed by a fire and rescue authority or by a Scottish fire authority. It replicates provision made in section 26(1) of the 1947 Act and puts it beyond any doubt that any scheme may make provision for the payment of benefits in respect of people who die while in service, whether they die in exercise of their duties or for any other reason. That is why we are repeating in the Bill that provision from the 1947 Act.

Philip Hammond: You do not need to do it.

Phil Hope: The hon. Gentleman says that, but we repeat it to put the matter beyond any reasonable doubt.
 Amendments Nos. 116 and 117 would seek to limit the freedom of the Secretary of State to recruit permanent staff into Her Majesty's fire service inspectorate, or into other posts, particularly training 
 posts at the Fire Service College. While such staff may be willing to transfer any pension rights into a scheme established for their new employment or to defer their rights in any scheme established for the fire and rescue service, that may not be satisfactory, or in the best interests of the individual, who may be disadvantaged by such a change in their pension arrangements. 
 If we are to ensure that we can attract good staff to central service, which will benefit the advice and training that can be given, we need to ensure that members of the fire and rescue service do not believe that their benefits, including their pension, will be adversely affected. The provision will also allow us to respect our obligations to members of the fire and rescue service who join the reserve forces and would otherwise run the risk of being adversely affected because a fire and rescue authority would not be able to treat any periods of service in the reserve forces, the Territorial Army, as pensionable service.

Philip Hammond: On a point of order, Mr. O'Hara, will you clarify whether it is possible for the Programming Sub-Committee to be reconvened at any point when the Committee is sitting?

Edward O'Hara: As long as there is time to do so. I do not know that there is time for the Programming Sub-Committee to meet and for me to wield the knife, as I am instructed to do, at five o'clock.

Nick Raynsford: Further to that point of order, Mr. O'Hara. May I suggest that we have an immediate meeting of the Programming Sub-Committee, if that is in order? It may facilitate arrangements to lift the knife so that this debate can continue on Tuesday morning.

Edward O'Hara: Let us do that.
 Sitting suspended. 
 On resuming— 
 Resolved, 
That proceedings on the Bill from Clauses 25 to 51 should conclude at 5 pm at the 10th sitting.—[Mr. Raynsford.]

Phil Hope: Amendment No. 118 would prevent people who move from employment with one fire and rescue authority to a new authority, or who take employment with the Secretary of State on central service, from transferring their pension rights under arrangements which are set out in the Firemen's Pension Scheme Order 1992 and which predate that order. Under those arrangements, payments representing the cash value of pension rights earned by the individual's service in the employment of the first employer are calculated by reference to actuarial tables and are paid to the new employee. Acceptance of the amendment would mean that the existing arrangements for transferring pension rights could not continue to operate under any new scheme. These have worked well in practice and are understood by firefighters, which is why we cannot accept the amendment.
 Amendment No. 119 would not seem to provide any safeguard for either a fire and rescue authority or a firefighter. I shall explain that. The 1992 order 
 provides for injury awards to be made when a firefighter is permanently disabled as a result of a qualifying injury and is retired. If the person has a qualifying injury—one that, for example, occurred in the execution of his duties—he is entitled to an injury award which is determined by reference to loss of earnings. If the person is entitled to any other benefits—for example, payable by the Department for Work and Pensions—the award will be reduced by an equivalent amount to avoid duplication. 
 I can give the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge the assurance that he requires. If the firefighter is not content with an award, there will be rights of appeal under any new scheme as there are under the existing scheme. If the firefighter received an injury award, he would not be prevented from suing for negligence any person or body, including a fire and rescue authority, and that would not affect any benefits paid under the 1992 pension scheme. However, certain compensation payments paid under the firefighters conditions of service—the grey book—are liable to be offset by other compensation payments because they are regarded as an alternative to no-fault compensation payments, and the offset safeguards the financial position of the fire and rescue authority. Entitlement to benefits under the 1992 order is a right subject to the provisions of the scheme and not a 
 matter at the discretion of the fire and rescue authority. There is no need for a requirement in such circumstances for an individual to accept any award. 
 With that explanation, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will recognise that we have dealt with all his concerns and I ask him to withdraw his amendment.

Philip Hammond: I am most grateful to the Under-Secretary and I am glad that he has had the opportunity to explain the purpose of the provisions. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Amendments made: No. 166, in 
clause 33, page 15, line 8, after 'die' insert 'or have died'.
 No. 167, in 
clause 33, page 15, line 44, at end insert— 
 '(2A) An order under this section may take effect from a date which is earlier than that on which the order is made.'.—[Phil Hope.]
 Further consideration adjourned.—[Mr. Jim Murphy.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at three minutes past Five o'clock until Tuesday 2 March at twenty-five minutes past Nine o'clock.